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PIVOTAL POINTS IN THE TORRENS SYSTEM
In publications devoted to law or to real estate, we occasionally
see articles on the Torrens System of conveying land. These
articles consist largely of reviews of and comments on the cases
decided by the supreme courts of several states, upholding the
constitutionality of Torrens acts. These cases set forth the pro-
visions of the acts concerning the suit to be brought to quiet
and establish title to land for the purpose of registering it, and,
except in two cases, they declare that these acts do not infringe
upon any of our constitutional guaranties. They are valuable
additions to the law concerning the quieting of titles to land.
It would be well for all our states to recognize the development
of the law, made by these cases, by passing general acts for the
declaration and quieting of titles along the lines set forth in the
most progressive Torrens acts and in the McEnerny Act of Cali-
fornia. But provisions of statutes for quieting titles do not
touch upon any principle of the Torrens system. They treat of
matters arising under an act prior to the iegistration of the title,
and the principles of the Torrens system operate only on titles
which have been registered. The only cases in this country which
treated of or discussed any fundamental principles of the Tor-
rens system are People v. Chase' and State v. Guilbert,2 and they
touched on them in a meager way. They held that an original
registration of a title could not be made by a registrar and with-
out due process of law, and in all later cases, in passing on other
Torrens acts, the courts contented themselves with holding merely
that the acts provided for the first and original registration of a
title in a proper judicial method.
But the Torrens system is not especially concerned about
adversary proceedings in court. It is not a judicial system where
every step in the title is adjudicated in court or where deeds are
protocolised by decree of court on every transfer. It is not a
judicial system, but an official system. The registrar and his
register are the central figures about which the whole system
turns, and every provision of a Torrens statute which does not
relate to one or the other is merely incidental and ancillary to the
working of the system around the pivotal and essential points,
the registrar and his register. A treatise on any of the provisions
2 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454.
2 56 Oh. St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 6o Am. St. Rep. 756, 38 L. R. A. 5,9.
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of a Torrens act is a discussion of an incidental matter unless
it pertains to the powers and duties of the registrar or to the
effect of his register. Torrens acts the world over may differ
as between themselves in all of their provisions, except that all
must provide for a registrar who shall register titles as they are
presented to him and all must declare that his register, his certifi-
cate of title, shall be conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
registered estate in all courts and in all places. Since this decla-
ration of the indefeasibility of a registered title is the pith of the
whole system, it seems strange that it was not even touched upon
in any of the decided cases sustaining the constitutionality of a
Torrens act, and it also seems strange that it has not challenged
some discussion in our legal periodicals. In view of the fact that
every year or two some state passes a Torrens act, it would seem
that the time is ripe for a thorough examination and study of the
principles of the system by the members of the legal profession.
All Torrens acts provide in effect that an officer charged with
the duty of making registrations shall consider any title to land
submitted to him for the purpose of registration, and that he
shall make a public record of the status and condition of the
title according to his decision and judgment. These acts then
declare that the register of the title as made by him shall be in
all courts and in all places conclusive evidence of the title as
registered. Several principles and propositions arise out of such
statutory provisions.
(i) They create but one estate or interest in land and that is
the registered estate, in lieu of legal and equitable estates. If
the register, the certificate of title, is conclusive evidence of the
ownership and condition of the estate in land as registered, no
claim of interest not shown on the register has any possible
validity. If it existed prior to the issue of the certificate it was
cut off when the certificate was issued containing no notation of
it. Whether the failure to make such notation arose from a mere
omission, or from a mistake of law or fact, on the part of the
registrar, is of no consequence; the law declares the estate as
registered to be unimpeachable. No notice or knowledge on the
part of a purchaser of registered land that there is an interest or
equity not shown of record will invalidate his certificate when it
is once issued to him, unless the transaction amounts to actual,
not merely constructive, fraud. In the absence of actual fraud
the registered estate is in the holder of the certificate. The
statute does not differentiate between the first and subsequent
certificates or between those who have had notice of equities off
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the register and those who have purchased in good faith for
value without notice. It simply declares that the registered estate
shall be good everywhere and from any point of view. It is
manifest that the registered interest is the only estate or interest
in land. It is also evident that the system of registering titles
is governed by strict statutory law, as against principles of equity.
The original laws concerning recording instruments of title were
intended to create a record which might be relied on to show all
the evidences of titles to land, but, by the application of principles
of equity and the doctrine of notice off the record, the recorded
evidence of title is only one branch of it. The declaration of
the indefeasibility of the title as registered, of the conclusiveness
of a certificate of title, is absolutely essential to the working of
the Torrens system.
(2) Where the registrar's act in issuing a certificate is con-
clusive evidence of ownership of the estate as registered, it is
evident that the act of registration is necessarily the operative
act to convey and effect the title. All Torrens acts declare that
it is the operative act. Undoubtedly it is competent for the legis-
lature to declare that no title to registered land shall pass from a
transferor to a transferee unless and until the transfer has been
registered, just as it may declare that no title shall pass from a
grantor to a grantee of unregistered land unless and until the
deed is recorded in the recorder's office. But it depends on the
meaning of the phrase, whether our legislatures may declare that
the registrar's act in making the registration is the operative act
to effect or convey the title. In foreign countries the act of
registration actually conveys the title just as it is registered. On
an application for registration under the statute, the act of regis-
tering the applicant as the owner ex proprio vigore divests any
outstanding title or interest from any other person and vests it
in the person registered, so that he at once becomes the owner
whether or not he had any interest in the land before his regis-
tration and the issue of the certificate to him.3 The mere errone-
ous first registration of a title in a person is not a ground which
can be urged by the true owner for an impeachment of the cer-
tificate. The registrar has full power to act in the premises and
his act is binding on all the world, whether it is right or wrong.
If this were not the rule, the act of the registrar would not be
the operative act to establish and effect the title, and the statutory
'Anderson v. Davy, i N. Z. S. C. 3o2; Coleman v. Riria Puwhanga,
N. Z. L. R. 4 S. C. 230.
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declaration would not mean what it says so plainly when it
declares that every certificate shall be conclusive evidence of title
in all places. After land is registered no person about to deal
with the title need inquire back of the last certificate of regis-
tration, and he need not inquire whether the last registered owner
procured his registration through an erroneous registration or
as the result of a fraud or forgery, because the last certificate
of ownership forms a new and perfect root of title which will
sustain the purchaser's title when he is registered as owner by the
act of the registrar. For centuries land was conveyed by the act
of the owner, and the efficacy of a deed depended on the validity'
of the title of the grantor, or on his power to convey the land,
but where the title is vested by statute through the act of the
registrar, a transfer of registered land does not depend in the
least on the validity of the title of the transferor, or on the
validity of his instrument of transfer. Where the mere act of
registration transfers and vests the title pursuant to the very
terms of the certificate of ownership, a registration, erroneous as
to matters of fact or law arising in the title or in the transfer
of it, must necessarily divest the title or some part of it from the
real owner, in order to vest it in and transfer it to the person
registered as owner. If the act of registration vests or transfers
an indefeasible title to the registered owner only when the appli-
cant or the transferor has such a title, the act- of registration
is not the operative act, vesting or effecting ex proprio vigore
the title. The register is a mere record of the supposed legal
effect of the links in the chain of title, and examination of the
whole title must be made in order to determine whether the cer-
tificate states the true ownership and condition of the title. If
the statute does not mean what it says about the act of registra-
tion and about the incontestableness of a certificate of ownership
of land, issued under it by the proper officer, it is a snare for the
unwary and the confiding.
(3) In foreign countries the act of registration is a solemn
adjudication by the registrar on the rights of all persons in the
land, whether these rights are in the registered estate or whether
they relate to the validity or priority of liens on the estate. Hav-
ing fixed a method of adjudication as to the ownership and con-
dition of the title, binding on all the world, foreign statutes
declare that this adjudication may never be put in question in
any court or in any place. It is evident that the act of registra-
tion is not clerical or administrative, but is judicial. It certifies
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to a legal conclusion, namely, that a certain person is the owner
of a certain estate in land, subject to such burdens as are set
forth in the register. The first act in Illinois concerning land
titles (1895) provided that upon the filing with the registrar of
an application for registration, he should cause examination to
be made into the applicant's title to the land as shown by the
abstract of title presented, and as to the truth of the matters set
forth in his application, and if it should be made to appear to the
registrar that the facts stated in the application were true and
that the applicant was the owner of the land, he should issue a
certificate of title unimpeachable after five years, and bring the
land under the act; otherwise he should dismiss the application
without prejudice. In considering these provisions of'the act,
the Supreme Court held in People v. Chase4 that if an officer is
clothed with power of adjudicating upon and protecting the rights
or interests of persons, though not finally determining the rights,
which are brought before him, he is concerned with a judicial
proceeding and exercises judicial functions, and it was further
held that the act was invalid as conferring judicial powers on an
administrative officer. These sections of the Illinois act were
almost identical with certain sections of the act of Victoria, 189o,
and concerning the latter it was said, "The intention of the legis-
lature was obviously to impose the duty upon the registrar to
prevent instruments being registered which, in law as well as in
fact, ought not to be registered in the first instance and to deter-
mine the validity of the instruments, as well as the priority of
registration in point of time. He has therefore to discharge not
merely ministerial but judicial duties." 5 The next Torrens act
in Illinois provided for an adversary proceeding in a court of
general jurisdiction to quiet and declare the title and provided
that the registrar should register the title according to the terms
of the decree in the case. This proceeding was held to form the
basis for a valid registration in People v. Simon.
6 The latter act
and all the Torrens acts which have been passed since in this
country provide that on a transfer of the land from the original
registered owner or from some subsequent registered owner, the
registrar shall examine the instrument of transfer and if he is
satisfied that the instrument is a proper one and that the trans-
feree or devisee should be registered as owner, he shall issue a
" Supra.
'In re, etc., ex parte Bond, 6 V. L. R. (L) 458.
'176 Ill. i65, 52 N. E. 9IO, 68 Am. St. Rep. I75, 44 L. R. A. 8oi.
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new certificate to him. There is a certain vagueness in most of
the statutes as to what the registrar shall be satisfied about in
passing on a transfer of registered land, as if the points of his
satisfaction should not be made too definite, but this is certainly
what all the provisions on that subject mean. These provisions
as to subsequent registration might have been discussed and
passed upon in each of the cases involving the constitutionality
of a Torrens act, but, as has been said, the courts were content
to pass only on the validity of the original registration under a
decree in a contested suit, leaving subsequent transfers of the
property by the sole act of the registrar entirely out of considera-
tion. Under the Illinois act of 1895 the registrar was to examine
or cause to be examined the abstract of title to the land in order
to determine whether he would register the applicant as the first
registered owner, and he was to examine the instrument of trans-
fer on each registration subsequent to the first, in order to
determine whether he should make a new registration to the new
registered owner. His determination on the abstract as to the
ownership of the title to the land was held to be a judicial act
and yet his work and duty in passing on an abstract of title and
on a single instrument of transfer differs only in amount and not
in kind. If his act is judicial in one case it would seem to be
so necessarily in the other. If his certificate of title is not con-
clusive evidence of ownership on original registration, it cannot
be so on any subsequent one. Indeed, under all foreign Torrens
acts, the power of the registrar is more unrestricted in making
registrations on transfers of registered land than it is in bring-
ing unregistered land under the act by first and original registra-
tion. The Australian acts are not exactly alike in the provisions
regarding initial registration of titles, but they are very similar
and may be stated in a general way. If it appears to the regis-
trar from the report of the examiner that the title of the appli-
cant is free from any lien or conflicting interest, he causes notice
of the application to be advertised in a newspaper for a certain
length of time, and in the notice appoints a time for hearing, not
less than thirty days or more than one year from the time of the
last advertisement. Unless in the interval he receives a caveat
from some person who claims an interest in the land, forbidding
him to do so, he proceeds to bring the land under the act by
placing it on a public register, so that an indefeasible title to the
estate is held by the registered owner of it and is transferable
only by entry on the register. If it appears to the registrar from
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the report of the examiner that the title is imperfect and defec-
tive, he may reject it or he may give notice of a time of hear-
ing by publication and by personal notice to all interested persons
where possible. He designates the persons to be notified and the
kind of notice to be given, and he may require proof of service.
The time set for the hearing must not be less than thirty days or
more than one year from the time of the last publication. Unless
a caveat is filed he may bring the land under the act at the hear-
ing. He is clothed with the power to pass on all questions of law
arising in a title submitted to him for registration and to hear
evidence concerning facts affecting the title, but he is not a judge
of a court having jurisdiction to pass on contested claims in an
adversary proceeding. Of his own motion he may submit to the
court any question of law which may arise in the title, but unless
a caveat is filed and the application is contested, the court may
not be called on to inquire into and determine questions of
fact; and if a caveat is filed and a contest concerning the title
is made, he has no power to consider the application, and it
must be referred to the court to be tried as a litigated case.
1
But no Torrens act provides that any notice shall be given by pub-
lication or otherwise to persons who may be interested in the
transfer of land from one registered owner to another. The
statutes generally require that the instrument of transfer shall
be presented to the registrar and that he shall register the new
owner on being satisfied that the transferee is entitled to be
registered. Most acts provide that any person feeling himself
aggrieved by the action of the registrar in any matter involving
his functions or duties may apply to court by petition, bill or
complaint to require him to perform his duty properly; but,
nevertheless, under most acts on a transfer of registered land, the
registrar alone has power to make a new entry, no court has
power to direct what registration he shall make, he is not
required to give notice and opportunity for hearing to any per-
son, and his certificate is conclusive evidence of ownership as
against all the world. The purpose and simplicity of the system
require that when land once has been registered, the registrar
shall administer the act creating the system, and shall make all
transfers of land according to his own judgment, without direc-
1 Secs. 17-23, New South Wales act; Secs. 18-28, Queensland act;
Secs. 2o-3o, New Zealand act; Secs. 31-40, South Australia act; Secs.
15-24, Tasmania act; Secs. 22-33, Victoria act; Secs. 21-33, Western
Australia act; In re Stanley, 24 W. N. (N. S. W.) 74.
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tion or supervision from courts and without notice to interested
persons. In People v. Chase and State v. Guilbert, supra, it was
held that an original certificate could be created only by a power
judicial in its scope and nature, and by analogy one might think
that such a power was necessary for the creation of conclusive
certificates of title on subsequent registration. Nevertheless,
since the decision in People v. Simon, supra, (1898) many states
have passed Torrens acts containing provisions for the issue by
the registrar of conclusive certificates on transfers of registered
lands, and the courts in passing on the constitutionality of these
acts have ignored the legal questions involved in them. No state
which has passed a Torrens act has a constitutional provision per-
mitting its legislature to make the registrar a judicial officer, and
he must be held to exercise only administrative functions in mak-
ing a certificate of ownership of the title. A certificate signed by
an administrative officer is not necessarily in and of itself con-
clusive evidence of the matters of fact and of law set forth and
declared therein, and a legislature in this country may not enact
a law making evidence conclusive which is not necessarily so in
and of itself. In a judicial investigation the law of the land
requires an opportunity for trial of the rights of the parties, and
there can be no trial of rights in registered land if the certificate
of an executive officer is conclusive evidence of ownership in
all courts and in all places, and if only one party may produce
his proofs. To preclude a party from going behind such a cer-
tificate, and from showing the truth concerning his rights in the
property is nothing short of invasion of the judicial province,
confiscation of property and destruction of vested rights, with-
out due process of law. It has been held repeatedly in this
country that it is not within the legislative power to declare what
shall be conclusive evidence.8
In a judicial trial on proper pleading it is always competent to
show that there has been between the parties a former adjudica-
tion of the matters involved. In foreign jurisdictions an adjudi-
8 State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 46 N. E. 145, 36 L. R. A. 179; Wantlan v.
White, ig Ind. 470; State v. Buck, 12o Mo. 479, 25 S. W. 573; People
v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759; Felix v. Wallace Co., 62 Kans.
832, 62 Pac. 667; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L..
Ed. 97o; U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 2o L. Ed. 519; People v. Rose,
207 Ill. 352, 361, 69 N. E. 762; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa 70; Baart v.
Martin, 99 Minn. 2o4, io8 N. W. 915; Farmers' Union v. Thresher, 62
Cal. 4o7; Cooley Const. Lim. (5 Ed.) 453-5; 3 Cyc. of Ev., 292; 8 Cyc.
of Law, 820.
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cation takes place when the registrar performs the act of regis-
tration under the terms of the Torrens acts, and this adjudication
is declared by statute to be binding against all the world in all
courts and in all places within those jurisdictions. Some lawyers
who are attracted by many qualities of the Torrens system
have advocated the placing in the state constitutions of pro-
visions enabling legislatures to confer judicial power on regis-
trars. In the new constitution of Ohio, as in force and effect
January I, 1914,9 it is provided: "Laws may be passed providing
for a system of registering, transferring, insuring and guaran-
teeing land titles by the state or by the counties thereof, and for
settling and determining adverse or other claims to and interests
in lands, the titles to which are so registered, insured or guaran-
teed, and for the creation and collection of guaranty funds by
fees to be assessed against lands, the titles to which are registered;
and judicial powers with right of appeal may by law be conferred
upon county recorders or other officers in matters arising under
the operation of such system." A constitutional amendment now
before the people of Pennsylvania is substantially like the pro-
visions just quoted, and it provides also that new courts may be
established for carrying the system into effect. By these pro-
visions it is probably intended that the first and original regis-
tration shall be made by an adversary proceeding in court,
according to the practice which has obtained in this country, and
that judicial powers with right of appeal may be conferred by
law on registrars of title for settling and determining adverse and
other claims to and interests in the titles to lands which have been
registered. In foreign countries legislatures may make the record
of a judicial officer import verity and may make it an absolute
adjudication of the rights in the land of all persons in the world,
whether they were present at the adjudication or not, whether
they had notice of the proceeding or not, and whether they had
an opportunity to be heard or not. But in this country merely
making the registrar a judicial officer does not go far enough to
avoid the fifteenth amendment of the federal constitution, which
provides that a state legislature may not deprive any person of
property without due process of law. Among other things, due
process of law requires judicial authority of competent jurisdic-
tion and notice and opportunity to be heard. A judicial officer
is not necessarily a court, with power to issue summons and hear
'Art. II, Sec. 4o.
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litigated cases, and he has not been made such by the foreign
statutes, but if a Torrens act to be passed in Ohio shall provide
for summons to all interested persons and for a judicial deter-
mination of all contested rights in land, when it is to be trans-
ferred from one registered owner to another, the proceeding will
be an adjudication as to all parties personally or constructively
served with process, but not necessarily as to all the world. The
proceeding will have to be examined in order to determine that
all interested persons are bound by the adjudication, and in any
subsequent litigation over the title the record of the proceedings
before the registrar will have to be introduced in evidence in
order to lay a sufficient foundation for the introduction in evi-
dence of the former adjudication, the certificate of title. In other
words, the statute to be passed in Ohio, in order to be sufficient
under the fifteenth amendment, must create a judicial system
of conveying land which has been registered, and not the Tor-
rens system which creates an indefeasible title in the registered
holder by the very fact of the issue of a certificate to him by the
registrar. On receipt of the last duplicate certificate of title and
of an instrument of transfer, whether it be a will, proof of heir-
ship and due administration in an intestate estate, or a deed, a
foreign registrar, as a part of his official routine, without notice
to anyone and without opportunity on the part of anyone to be
heard, issues a new certificate according to his judgment on the
law and the facts, and this new certificate vests the title as regis-
tered in the new certificate holder, whether his act is correct or
erroneous. A Torrens certificate of title is a public register,
established by a state, creating an indisputable title to the estate
in land as adjudicated and entered by a judicial officer who binds
the whole world by his act, and evidencing in and of itself such
title in all places in the state. Two elements of this definition
always must be lacking in any certificate of ownership of land
issued in this country, whether it be issued by an administrative
or a judicial officer, or even by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Here a certificate cannot create an indisputable title to land, and
though in fact in a given case it may certify the facts correctly,
it is not in and of itself conclusive evidence of the facts set forth
therein. An administrative certificate has been treated of. The
binding and conclusive character of a judgment or certificate
of a judicial officer, or of a court of competent jurisdiction, is
dependent on its jurisdiction of the parties to be affected by it,
and the record of the proceeding in which the judgment or cer-
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tificate arose must be presented always in order to lay a proper
foundation for the introduction of the judgment or certificate, and
in order to show that by due process of law the opposing claim-
ant had an opportunity to be heard in determining what judg-
ment or what certificate should be entered in the action. Whether
a court or a judicial registrar had power to register a title against
all the world depends on the facts in each case under considera-
tion, and these facts must be shown before the register may be
produced as a bar in any place."0
The judicial proceeding in original registration, according to
the Torrens acts in this country, is the establishment and declara-
tion of the title to the land, and the certificate issued by the regis-
trar pursuant to the terms of the decree is merely a clerical
addition to it, signifying nothing to those who understand it, and
setting forth conclusions of law as to the title and ownership of
the property which may or may not be true, according to the
opinion of most lawyers.. It is a base imitation of a real Tor-
rens certificate, and any person who deals with the land and pays
out his money on the strength of the certificate does so at his
peril.
It is sometimes said that the Torrens system is a method of
state insurance or guaranty of title. It is just the opposite of this.
A contract of insurance or guaranty of title is one of indemnity
in case the title shall fail, but under the Torrens system the
state through its declaration of the indefeasibility of a regis-
tered title establishes it so that it cannot fail. The insurance
or indemnity fund under the system is not for the holder of the
certificate of title, but for persons who may be deprived of rights
or interests in land by this declaration of indefeasibility. When
the state puts a person on the list of registered owners of land
within its borders it does not insure his title, but vests it in him.
A person divested of some right in the land by the registration of
another as owner goes to the indemnity fund for compensation,
because by the registration he is barred from recovery of his
right in the land. The purpose of registering titles, instead of
the evidences of title, is two-fold, to give certainty of title to the
person who is put on the list of owners of registered estates,
and to facilitate transfers of registered estates by doing away
with the necessity for any examination of the title back of the
last certificate. Can this system with its many admirable quali-
ties and great achievements be worked in this country? Is the
"Partenfelder v. The People, 211 N. Y. 355. (1914.)
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necessity of the system for an official certificate of ownership
in and of itself incontestable repugnant to our constitutional
necessity for due process of law in depriving a person of prop-
erty rights? Can a registrar, even though clothed with judicial
power, make an examination of an instrument on a transfer of
registered land once and for all persons, and by his judgment
and act of registration bind all the world so that no one can
question it? In Australasia, where the colony and the states have
power to declare a certificate of title indisputable, and where the
system has been developed for more than sixty years, a purchaser
in good faith and for value may deal with the last registered
owner, get a new certificate, and know beyond peradventure that
no prior mistakes of law or fact and no prior fraud or forgery
may prevail against it. On this point the language of our stat-
utes and of the Australasian statutes is the same. Do the statutes
produce the same results here? A system by which persons by
an inspection of the register may ascertain absolutely who holds
title to a particular piece of land, and what burdens, if any, are
on it, though more complicated than a mere statement of its ele-
mentary principles might indicate, is worthy of adoption if it
can be created under our laws.
It has been said cynically that nothing so befogs a subject as
a general discussion of it, but if this be so it is only because the
subject is not understood clearly by those who discuss it. In our
books we have many interpretations of the meaning of due pro-
cess of law, but a full understanding of the Torrens system may
be had only by study of the reported cases which have arisen in
the six states of the Commonwealth of Australia and in the self-
governing colony of New Zealand. Great help may be obtained
from Hogg's valuable treatise on the Australian Torrens System.
The so-called Torrens cases which have arisen in this country do
not touch the pivotal points of the system, and a discussion of
the Torrens system in the light of these cases leads nowhere,
except to confusion.
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